Chronotope’s avatarChronotope’s Twitter Archive—№ 109,475

                                                                                                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                                      I think it is genuinely, non-sarcastically, worthwhile to engage in examining Google's efforts here, because it is important to understand what is occurring and why it is occurring the way it is. So let's understand the threat model and engage with it.
                                                                                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                                    For you non-engineers, let's translate this down: "threat model" in this case is (basically) a complicated way of saying "What's the problem?" So, what, according to Google, is the problem?
                                                                                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                                  Graf 3 makes this very clear. The problem, according to Google, is that users want privacy but "publishers' economic viability" (how they make money) is dependent on tracking users in a way that is similar to assigning them a web-wide global identity.
                                                                                                  oh my god twitter doesn’t include alt text from images in their API
                                                                                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                                I think this is an incorrect statement. This is based on a dependence on a particular way of doing things. Sure, publishers currently use personally identifiable information for ad targeting, but that's because that is the state of the ecosystem...
                                                                                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                              Let's not get into the motives for stating the problem this way (but worth noting: Google makes a lot of money off of tagging and tracking PII, so they are clearly as--if not more--threatened than any publisher), but also, we could imagine a different way. digiday.com/media/were-building-for-media-businesses-of-tomorrow-how-the-washington-post-is-preparing-for-a-cookieless-future/
                                                                                              OpenGraph image for digiday.com/media/were-building-for-media-businesses-of-tomorrow-how-the-washington-post-is-preparing-for-a-cookieless-future/
                                                                                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                            So I think the core threat: 'increased privacy makes it unlikely that publishers can continue to survive' is very much worth challenging. If browsers turned off *all* the user tracking and fingerprinting tomorrow would marketing budgets suddenly disappear? I don't really think so
                                                                                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                          In a world where tracking was banned and user privacy was fully enforced, I suspect there would be some period where the ecosystem adapted that wouldn't be great for many publishers, but it would eventually bounce back. The brands are still looking to advertise after all.
                                                                                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                        So I don't really agree that the only way forward for effective advertising for publishers is full-on user tracking, which seems to be the initial threat at top here. But let's continue to parse the document...
                                                                                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                      100% agree with graf 5
                                                                                      oh my god twitter doesn’t include alt text from images in their API
                                                                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                    So do we need *any* identity model? Google's post here doesn't engage with that question, but it *is* worth engaging, especially for any non-technical people. The answer is: yes. You want to sign in to sites, you want to pay for things, etc... all that needs some sort of identity
                                                                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                  At one extreme is our current world, where every login can potentially plant more PII to allow you to be targeted. Obviously, people--users of browsers and publisher sites--are increasingly uncomfortable with this current approach.
                                                                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                At the other end is something like the Privacy Pass proposal, which allows users to maintain an identity in one place and use it to log in to things without ever having to pass PII to any entity but the single trusted site/provider. privacypass.github.io/
                                                                                OpenGraph image for privacypass.github.io/
                                                                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                              Google takes it as a given here that: 1: You will need a single identity across some range of web activity (so what is that range?) 2: That some data will have to move from an identity held by one entity to an identity held by another identity.
                                                                              oh my god twitter doesn’t include alt text from images in their API
                                                                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                            More simply: 1: You need an identity on the web in some situations sometimes beyond a simple login to a site. 2: Your identity = information about you & some of that information about you should be able to move from your identity on one site to your identity on another site.
                                                                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                          Alright. I agree, for the web, browsers, everyone to move forward these are indeed questions that need answering. You still want to log in to things. Also, if you've ever used Apple, Google, PayPal or FB to log into things, then information needs--to some degree--to be shared.
                                                                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                        Ok. Now things get /complicated/. The threat is modeled, an answer proposed. 1st: First Party Sites get a distinct identity of users. A first party site (eTLD+1) is the site you are on. If you are reading this on Twitter dot com, Twitter dot com is your 1st Party.
                                                                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                      Ok. So I do have a challenge to pt 1 of proposal 1. Which is: should mysite dot com get to assign you an identity without your consent? This is generally accepted in this document and is a baseline assumption of the internet right now, but doesn't need to be...
                                                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                    Notably sites who follow GDPR & EU cookie rules can potentially end up not assigning you a cookie at all! (cookie = some data to begin 1st party tracking in your browser). I don't think we have to take it as a given that a site gets to assign you an identity at all! So mark that.
                                                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                  Part 1, point 2: "The central privacy threat is joining these per-site identities across distinct first parties. Browsers impose limits (on cookies, fingerprinting, and other state) with the goal of preventing the joinability of these per-1p identities." Agreed 100%!
                                                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                Ok, point 3 is sorta complicated for its relatively short length. But at a basic level, the proposal is: Currently, browsers will only define one domain as First Party. But Google proposes that more than one domain be allowed to be considered 1st party - mikewest.github.io/first-party-sets/
                                                                OpenGraph image for mikewest.github.io/first-party-sets/
                                                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                              Once again, assuming a less technical audience here needs this broken down so hopefully I can get it right:
                                                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                            Currently if you arrive on twitter dot com to read this, twitter can place a cookie on you. In that situation that cookie is accessible only to twitter dot com and subdomains (hi.twitter dot com for example). But not to myblog dot com.
                                                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                          I haven't dug deep in the history or anything but generally this is considered a good idea for preserving the security of your identity but also because some web developers are idiots and might store your password in plaintext on the cookie. Makes sense!
                                                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                        Now... for some reason big tech companies have created a situation wherein this is a problem. See Google controls youtube dot com and google dot com. Apple has apple dot com and icloud dot com. These single companies have multiple 1st party domains need to talk to each other.
                                                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                      Can I be honest with you? I might be an idiot here, but I have no idea why these companies do this. Why not icloud dot apple dot com or youtube dot google dot com? If you know please tell me because I'd like to!
                                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                    There might have been a time when doing that restricted infrastructure (kept many sites on one physical server) but that has long not been the case. So like... I understand why big tech companies w/all these domains have this problem, but I'm not sure why it's the users' problem
                                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                  There's an *additional* problem which is that Native Web Apps have their own domains and like... if you have an account on myblog dot com you want to be able to allow it to sign you in to MyBlogApp also... so there's that. Apple and Google have existing methods for handling this.
                                                  oh my god twitter doesn’t include alt text from images in their API
                                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                But for... arbitrary reasons? it appears that Apple and Google have different ways of telling apps and sites they have permission to interact with each other. Fundamentally though they are sets of ids of apps and ids of websites that are allowed to talk to each other.
                                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                              Ok, so we do *need* this. Apps, despite pretending like they are some magical other world, are basically just web pages in boxes that need to talk to other web pages easily otherwise the user experience goes to crap.
                                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                            Personally I think the solution to this is to get rid of all apps forever and just use web pages like our bearded internet hippie forefathers intended but I guess I am going to be in the minority there, so a unified standard would be helpful here!
                                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                          But then we get into the meat of "First Party Sets" proposal and it is a little more uhhhh worrisome to me personally. Now the author is very clear here: "Though this isn’t a proposal that’s well thought out, and stamped solidly with the Google Seal of Approval" so slack given
                                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                        But also this proposal was listed as a significant point in thinking how the privacy of the web will be reworked and is t/f up for examination here.
                                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                      Anyway, the issue I have is that the core is to allow browsers to consider a full set of *different* urls as 'first party urls'. So, MyBlog dot com could come to an agreement with AdServerX dot com and we could share our "first party status" across both sites.
                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                    Literally the first thing my mind skips to is gray hat web rings. Seems like this proposal at the point would open up a potential risk with little potential reward to users. After all, they can already do cross site sign in via other means. Chronotope/735605725351796737
                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                  The author of the piece also notes this could potentially be exploited by ad servers who will require entry into the first party set for use. I think they have a good explanation here of the risks, though not a full grasp on the scale and likelihood. mikewest.github.io/first-party-sets/#how-will-malicious-actors-abuse-this-mechanism
                                  OpenGraph image for mikewest.github.io/first-party-sets/#how-will-malicious-actors-abuse-this-mechanismoh my god twitter doesn’t include alt text from images in their API
                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                There's more detail in this proposal for shared first parties, but generally I think that the risk outweighs the reward. I'm not convinced by arguments otherwise here, but perhaps there is something I'm missing. We can set this aside for now and go back to the main proposal.
                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                              There's another piece of this point about limiting how identity is shared between these potentially first-party-shared domains, but it is very generally stated and unclear in implementation, so I'm just going to note the link github.com/jkarlin/floc
                              OpenGraph image for github.com/jkarlin/floc
                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                            It's worth noting that this proposal does seem to imply that first-party-ness be shared between general providers (like an ad server, for example) and specific sites allowing for shared first party status between PayPal and my private tip jar site (to make up another example).
                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                          I'm not sure I agree w/a number of these points. I don't think browsers can sufficiently explain to non-technical users what is going on or why they should care. I'm not sure why this is *better* than current cross-site methods.
                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                        Generally I'm not sure this first party joining process would be good? Like... for one it requires manipulation of a number of chunks of your site and for two it would privilege preexisting entrants who use first-party-sharing over new entrants in a way that cross-site doesn't
                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                      The proposal does make it clear that the number of first party shared domains would be limited which means that if I'm trying to use an ad server or network, or payment provider and it requires shared first-party-ness my capability to experiment w/new companies is curtailed.
                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                    Perhaps I'm not gaming this out properly? But this particular methodology seems to me to be a threat to the diversity of the web. I'd be interested in what other perspectives people have on this though.
                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                  There is another concern I have in that shared first-party-ness seems to authorize other domains to take action on your domain in a direct way that isn't as easy with cross site communication. That seems... worse? Like... significantly? I'm not sure what the advantage of that is.
              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                Ok, onward to the question of 3rd parties.
            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
              (a good time to note: I'm not a browser engineer, so if I get stuff wrong, please correct me!)
          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
            Ok so the third party section bakes in some assumptions we will want to unpack before we even venture into details. First: that Third Parties (sites outside the site you are currently on) should and need to be allowed access to identity information from a 1st party...
        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
          This is a weird assumption because it runs counter to reality. There is a percentage of web users in the EU right now who, using the rights granted to them by GDPR explicitly disallow this and surf the web relatively fine.
      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
        Also it puts us in a web that excludes the idea of complying with, as I personally understand it, how GDPR works. As a starting point for a web spec recommendation 'only potentially illegal' seems like a bad start. But perhaps I'm missing something.
    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
      The second assumption is that it conflates its third point "composability" or that third party websites need to operate within first party websites with the of transmission of identity to third parties...
  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
    The proposal is correct that we can't assume that all websites should build or host their own ad server or analytics service. Also, embeds should work! But once again we have an example in the EU of how this can happen without transmitting identity information.
    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
      Simply put: you can absolutely run analytics and ad servers and embeds from third parties without having to grant those third parties identity information from the first party about the user. In fact, browser changes could make that *easier* to do.
      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
        With this in mind, I would prefer to challenge the first point in this section entirely. Should first parties have a way to delegate user identity to 3rd parties? That's the first question to be asked. Then we can move on to scale, means and browser role.
        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
          So. Point one is the question of if user identity should be delegated to third parties in a way that allows third parties to join them or not.
          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
            I think this is a dangerous path in general and somewhat unenforceable on a broad technical level. Once a third party receives data what it can do with it in the background is basically unlimited by browser or first party as far as I can see.
            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
              Which means the threat of joining per-site identities in the proposed system would essentially be unlimited and unchallenged, just--perhaps--technically more difficult. We're back at cross-site tracking in other words.
              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                Perhaps browsers could limit the transmission of data to third parties (this is the next part of the proposal) but it will be a very careful balance.
                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                  Generally though, I think once we unhook the assumption that first parties need to give data to third parties that includes identity information about a user, it becomes clear this is an economic imperative not a technical one, which is fine, I accept people want to make money...
                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                    Let's state and accept one possibility here - which is third parties are forever blocked by browsers from receiving anything which could possibly be personal identity information and we're all instantly in compliance with GDPR and engage with the rest of the proposal.
                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                      I agree with most of the rest of this: Point 2 part b - access to data by third parties should be a privilege, one which the first party has total control over. It should not be assumed by the presence of the third party on page.
                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                        There are many ways to exercise that control, some are noted, but none suggested. It would be interesting to explore if we accept this world where first to third party identity data is a needed practice.
                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                          The same is restated in the final point. First party control over data transmission on their own site is very very important. 👍
                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                            Ok, last part of this: "A per-first-party identity can only be associated with small amounts of cross-site information" We've already accepted a parallel possibility: no user id data ever needs to be transmitted to third parties. That's one way, here are controls for another.
                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                              Ok, so pt 1: Browsers are responsible for a large portion of the balance "between user privacy and web platform usability". Agreed. Then it restates the assumption: there should be a way to join identities. 🤷‍♂️ Next piece: ...
                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                The idea is that those identities should be shared but that sharing should be difficult, limited, and "privacy-respecting" and only for "sufficiently useful" cases.
                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                  Which... right... ok, going along with the underlying assumptions here: this is difficult to define, the proposal notes it is a case-by-case level of difficult. Because yeah, of course. There are over 7,000 ad tech companies, they will all want to do this. Difficulty is high.
                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                    2nd point: it is ok to share first party data where that data is not particularly personal or identifying. YES, I agree with that all the way. I think it is perfectly fine to note that a user would be interested in a car ad because they are part of a group of many people who are.
                                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                      The approach described essentially takes semi-personal information and depersonalizes it by making it representative of a group not an individual. I will have to look deeper into the FLoC API proposal another time but that sounds reasonable. github.com/jkarlin/floc
                                      OpenGraph image for github.com/jkarlin/floc
                                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                        Next we deal with significantly closer to personally identifiable information which is: if a user clicks on an ad and arrives at cars4days dot com then the site which showed them the ad should get credit for that referral.
                                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                          I think the linked proposal here needs more work. Apple currently has an alternative one which I am really needing to discuss more on the GitHub there, but I don't think the level of potential personal data transmission is needed in order to measure this. github.com/csharrison/conversion-measurement-api
                                          OpenGraph image for github.com/csharrison/conversion-measurement-api
                                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                            This is Apple's proposal for the curious: github.com/WICG/ad-click-attribution
                                            OpenGraph image for github.com/WICG/ad-click-attribution
                                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                              There's a lot of very technical talk in both proposals about randomness and timing attacks I won't get into, but I think the core question is about how much data an "attribution event" (registering that a user who clicked on an ad also hit another site) contains and transmits.
                                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                There's also a secondary question of who gets to set up the attribution process (publishers or an ad server?) and who gets to receive the event (publishers or an ad server?) that are for another thread, but I think the core here is the amount of data sent matters. Why?...
                                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                  The amount of data sent for attribution matters because the more data that can be sent the higher chance someone will use it to create a unique ID for the user that can be reused on multiple sites and then we're back at the beginning again.
                                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                    Next point is about sites delegating trust. I think that is important, I previously mentioned privacy pass and the browser level concept is also linked here. github.com/dvorak42/trust-token-api
                                                    OpenGraph image for github.com/dvorak42/trust-token-api
                                                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                      Anyway, I agree that sites need to handle authentication of trusted users and that trust needs to be able to be visible cross-site. Sign-in over multiple sites is a standard of the web now and I think it is a good thing.
                                                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                        We just have to be careful of how much PII is leaked in this process. (Which is to say: ideally none.)
                                                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                          Absolutely yes: "It would not be OK for one site to learn the list of all domains visited by a given user"
                                                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                            Hard to imagine how APIs which allow cross site information could be evaluated to prevent that type of abuse though. That will be very interesting to dive into.
                                                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                              Ok, I agree with this one. Though I'm not sure what those use cases are. "Any use cases which rely on more than a small amount of cross-site information must not be able to associate that information with any per-first-party identity."
                                                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                There's a link to an equally long doc to read next, which presumably dives into this. I'm... going to get to that a little later: github.com/csharrison/conversion-measurement-api/blob/master/AGGREGATE.md
                                                                OpenGraph image for github.com/csharrison/conversion-measurement-api/blob/master/AGGREGATE.md
                                                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                  And there are links to Mozilla's policy: wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Anti_tracking_policy And WebKit's (Apple's) Policy: wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Anti_tracking_policy And yes "Threat models and prevention policies are different parts of the same conversation." But good to read em all yes?
                                                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                    That's it for now. I think that there are some real challenges to the assumptions in this document worth discussing. And some good stuff too! Also some things worth diving deeper into.
                                                                    1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                      The top link from Google is open to comment. I'll wait a little while for people to challenge my assumptions or take me to task over errors, but I will likely add a comment in the GitHub issues. Next on my reading list: the details from the blog post itself. But for this thread:
                                                                      1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                        (One last thing: I hope this made a very difficult subject easier to understand. The future of privacy on the web is important to us all, and I'd like it if more non-engineers could understand what's happening with it.)
                                                                        1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                          I agree, the way I framed it missed that graf 3 was noting the state of things today as the problem (not the future solution), though I think we may disagree about what elements of the problem need to be corrected, I want to add the author's clarification: Log3overLog2/1164590816901378048
                                                                          1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                            This is a good point: I was unclear on this, but yes: keep in mind that the total of this is purely about web apps, though the spec being discussed is potentially inspired by the issues of app authentication. Log3overLog2/1164594232088301568
                                                                            1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                              (To be clear web sites not phone apps)^
                                                                              1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                A correction to my interpretation of third party sets here, It looks like they may not be as pervasively defined as I had thought in my first reading: Log3overLog2/1164623649338511360
                                                                                1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                  1. …in reply to @Chronotope
                                                                                    (Note: I'm posting conversations as I resolve them with the author of the piece, the author is responding to each tweet with issues with my assumptions, interpretation, etc... which I very much appreciate and encourage you to read)


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